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CASES NOTED 627
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-U N REASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE-
PARTNERSHIP RECORDS
The Anti-Trust Division of the Department of Justice secured a subpoena
duces tecum, returnable before the federal grand jury, directed to only one
member of a partnership, requiring him to bring with him certain specified
records and communications of the partnership. Subsequently, the other
partners, not subpoenaed, in order to defeat the Government's purpose of
using the documents against them moved to quash the subpoena on the grounds
that the documents described therein constituted the private papers and
property of each of the partners, the production of which would constitute an
unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment and a violation
of their privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment to
the Federal Constitution. Held, motion to quash granted. The partnership
papers are the personal property of. each of the partners and the subpoena
issued to one partner, although not violative of the Fifth Amendment, works
an unreasonable search and seizure of the private papers of the unserved
partners under the Fourth Amendment. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 81 F.
Supp. 418 (S. D, Cal. 1948).
In sustaining the motion to quash solely on the ground of the Fourth
Amendment, 1 the court dismisses the unsubpoenaed partners' claim of their,
privilege against self-incrimination 2 by recourse to the well-established prin-
ciple that such claim is the personal privilege of the party subpoenaed, the
person who, under oath, is required to be a witness against himself.8
The guaranty against unreasonable search and seizure is designed to
prevent violations of private security of persons and property, and to prohibit
unlawful invasions of those rights.4 Although the constitutional provision is
generally invoked in the case of search warrants, the compulsory production
of private hooks and papers, via a subpoena duces tecum, is within the spirit
and meaning of the Fourth Amendment.5 However, the constitutional prohi-
bition of the search and seizure clause was not intended to interfere with the
power of the courts to compel, through a subpoena duces tecum, the produc-
tion of documentary evidence.6 The immunity provided is not from all searches
and seizures, but from unreasonable searches and seizures only.7 The substance
1. U. S. CorsT, AMEND. TV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated .. ").
2. U. S. CoNsr. AMEND. V ("No person . .. Shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself .. ").
3. United States v. White, 332 U. S. 694 (1944).
4. Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 585 (1904); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U. S. 465(1921).
5. Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 (1886)..
6. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43 (1906).
7. Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 (1925); Agnello v. United States, 296
U. S. 20 (1923).
MIAMI LAIV QUARTERLY
of the offense of an unreasonable search and seizure is the compulsory
production of private pal'ers, whether under a search warrant or a subpoena
duces tecum, against which the person is entitled to protection.8
This right of protection from an unreasonable search and seizure is a
personal one and can be asserted only by the party whose rights are being
violated.9 Although a corporation is not protected against self-incrimination,10
it is entitled to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures of its
papers under the Fourth Amendinent.11 in as full a measure as given to an
individual or partnership. 2 -lowever, a corporation cannot object to the
production of the corporate books in a proper case 11 where the writ is suitably
specific and properly limited in scope; 14 nor can a corporate officer object
even though the production of the corporate documents will disclose the guilt
of the officer.'5 Because of the broad visitorial powers of the Federal Govern-
ment over corporations, the protective provisions of the Fourth Amendment
have a more limited application in the colm)ulsory production of corporate books
and papers than they do with reference to the private papers of individuals."6
Nevertheless, the exercise of these visitorial powers over private and public
corporations must keep within the restrictions of the Fourth Amendment.1 7
For the subpoena may be so general,'s the search and seizure so unlawful, 19
or the supoena duces tecum so onerous as to work an unreasonable search
and seizure against which the corporation is protected.
2 0
The Fourth Amendment only protects the owner or claimant of the
property subjected to the unreasonable search or seizure. 2' Hence, in the
instant case, in rejecting the Government's contention that the partnership
8. Boyd v. United States, srpra.
9. Kelley v. United States, 61 F.2d 843 (C. C. A. 8th 1932); United States v.
DeVasto, 52 F.2d 26 (C. C. A. 2d 1931), cert. denied, 284 U. S. 678 (1931).
10. Hale v. Henkel, suprn.
11. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385 (1920).
12. Federal Trade Commission v. Lorillard Co., 283 Fed. 999 (D. C.2d N. Y.
1922).
13. Grant v. United States, 227 U. S. 74 (1913) ; Wheeler v. United States, 226
U. S. 478 (1912) ; accord, Thompson v. United States, 10 F.2d 781 (C. C. A. 7th 1926),
cert. denied, 270 U. S. 654 (1926) (A co-partnership, illegally, masquerading as a corpora-
tion, was, before discovery of its status, compelled by a subpoena duces tecum to produce
its Ix oks and papers; such production held not a violation of the Fourth Amendment).
.14. Hale v. Henkel, supra; Wheeler v. United States, supra.
15. Wilson v. United States, 221 U. S. 361 (1911) ; Essgee Co. v. United States, 262
U. S. 151 (1923).
16. Essgee Co. v. United States, supra.
17. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154' U. S. 447 (1894); Federal
Trade Commission v. Lorillard Co., supra.
18. Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Vermont, 207 U. S. 541 (1908) ; Hale v. Henkel,
3n pra.
19. Silverthorne Iumber Co. v. United States, supra.
2. Federal Trade Commission v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U. S. 298 (1924)
MeMann v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 87 F.2d 377 (C. C. A. 2d 1937), cert.
denied, 301 U. S. 684 (1937).
21. Graham v. United States, 15 F.2d 740 (C. C. A. 8th 1926) ; Coon v. United
States, 36 F.2d 164 (C. C. A. 10th 1929)'; Huhman v. United States, 42 F.2d 733 (C. C. A.
8th 1930).
CASES NOTED
was an entity distinct from its members 22 and that the partnership papers
were therefore the property of the firm, the court re-examines the fundamental
nature of the partnership relation as contrasted with that of the corporation
or unincorporated association, and holds that papers of the small family
partnership here involved belong to the partners as tenants in common. In
accepting the aggregate theory of partnership, the court is in accord with the
view of the jurisdictions which adopt the definition of partnership set forth
in the Uniform Partnership Law.23 Jn holding that the papers and books
subpoenaed are the property of each of the partners and that to compel their
production upon serving only one partner constitutes an unreasonable search
and seizure of the property of the others, the decision is in accord with early
Supreme Court cases holding that the compulsory production of one's private
papers for use in criminal proceedings is compelling him to be a witness against
himself and is equivalent to an unreasonable search and seizure within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
24
As the determination of what is an "unreasonable search and seizure"
is a judicial question 23 to be determined by the facts and circumstances of
each case, 26 this decision may not be considered a binding precedent in the
case of a large unincorporated association, e.g., a labor union, or, possibly,
partnerships of large numbers, or partnerships in which there are special
and limited as well as general partners. Such large bodies may be considered
more analogous to corporations than to individuals, or small family partner-
ships, in which case the Fourth Amendment will not be as liberally construed
in their favor.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-GRANTING OF ANNULMENT OR SUPPORT
WHERE PARTIES HAVE UNCLEAN HANDS
Petitioner, second husband of respondent, sought an annulment on
grounds of respondent's prior subsisting marriage. Petitioner had knowledge
prior to marriage to respondent that the divorce decree obtained by re-
spondent's first husband was of the Mexican mail-order variety and void for
want of jurisdiction. In the lower court, respondent's counter-claim for sup-
port for herself and the child of the disputed marriage was allowed, but the
petitioner's request for annulment was denied. Held, on appeal, that the
22. Francis v. McNeal, 228 U. S. 695 (1913); Horner v. Hamner, 249 Fed. 134
(C. C. A. 4th 1918) (under the Federal Bankruptcy Act, a partnership is treated as a
distinct entity).
23. UNIoRM PARTRsnip ACT § 6(1) ; Abbott v. Anderson, 265 111. 285, 106 N. E.
782 (1914) (a partnership is not an entity distinct from its members).
24. Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 132 (1921); Boyd v. United States, ssprg.
25. United States v. Vatune, 292 U. S. 497 (1923).
26. Peru v. United States, 4 F.2d 881 (C. C. A. 8th 1925) ; Go-Bart Importing Co.
v. United States, 282 U. S. 344 (1931).
